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Treaty Construction: Integrating the American 
Approaches to Nuclear Arms Control. 
INTRODUCTION 
Henry Kissinger once said, "It may seem like a paradox to 
ask diplomacy that it rescue mankind from the horrors of a 
thermonuclear holocaust ... almost everything conspires 
against the subtle negotiation, the artful compromise, of classi-
cal diplomacy . . . negotiations can be successful only if all 
parties accept some common standard transcending their 
dispute. " 1 
Present analyses of nuclear arms control efforts reflect this 
lack of 'confidence in international negotiation by focussing on 
legislative reorganization of domestic regulatory agencies.2 
. Congressional emphasis on the control of nuclear commerce,8 
and executive preference for Strategic Arms Limitation Talk 
(SALT) conferences,4 indicate that, at a moment when the 
1 H. A. KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY 203 (New York: 
Council on Foreign Relations) (1957). 
2 An informative analysis of recent legislative efforts in this direction is presented 
in an article by William Doub and Eugene Fidell, •• International Belations and 
Nuclear Commerce: Developments in United States Policy," 8 Law & Policy in 
Int'l Bus. 913 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Nuclear Commerce]. 
81£1., 928·9, see also Joint Committee on AtomiC! Energy, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 
2 Ann. Rep. on the Development, Use and Control of Nuclear Energy for the Com· 
mon Defense and Security and for Pea,ceful Purposes, pp. 10, 11 (Comm. Print 
1975) [hereinafter cited as JCAE 2d]. 
4 New York Times, March 5, 1977, at 1, col. 1; id., Apr. 16, 1977, at 3, col. 2. 
Although our formal presentation had been rebuffed, President Carter had faith in 
the successful outcome of discussions between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and the 
U. S. Secretary of State Vance. 
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potential for nuclear arms proliferation has never been 
greater;1 the United States is proceeding with arms control 
efforts ·without a coherent plan for integrating those efforts 
without conflict. 
This paper shall attempt to isolate, from the historical welter 
of nuclear arms control procedures,1I the fundamental concepts 
underlying the United States of America's attempts at arms 
control. After comparing the various implementing procedures, 
suggestions are proposed for better coordinating the imple-
mentation of the underlying concepts, rather than simply im-
plementing the procedures themselves. 
I. AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PROCEDURES - AN 
HISTORICAL VIEW 
A. International VB. Unilateral Control of Atomic Energy-
The Baruch Plan and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. 
The Baruch Plan,' which grew out of several studies, mainly 
the Acheson-Lillienthal Report,8 attempted implementation of 
Arms Control through the joint action of the entire world 
community within the United Nations. The plan called for 
the ownership of all nuclear materials, and facilities utilizing 
such materials, by an International Atomic Development 
II JCAE 2d 4 j Nuclear Commerce 916. 
II As we shall see, America haa attempted to implement various strategies at 
different times, as discussed in part I, '''fro.. Plans for international control failed, 
Bee note 11 and accompanying text. Present American procedures include bilateral 
treaties, section I.B., '''fro., trilateral treaties, section I.D., '''fro., and multilateral 
, , open" treaties, to which any state may adhere, section I.E., '''fra. Further compli· 
cations ensue from the conclusion of treaties with the International Atomic Energy 
Agency as a party, or treaties creating duties for such international agencies. Bee 
note 41, '''fro.. 
, "Proposals for an International Atomic Development Authority," made by 
Bernard M. Baruch, United States Representative to the United Nations Atomic 
Energy Commission at its opening session in New York, June 14, 1946. Dept. of 
State Bull., Vol. XIV, no. 364 (June 23, 1946) j 423 Int'! Conciliation 335 (Sept. 
1946). For background on preparation of the proposal, Bee I Foreign Relations 
of the United States, pp. "806, 827, 836, 848 (1946). 
8" A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy," March 16, 1946. 
Dept. of State pub. no. 2498 (Washington, 1946). The report was issued by the Sec-
retary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy. I Foreign Relationa, 0,. cit. p. 761 
(1946). 
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Agency ("IADA")." Strict inspection and sanctions, coupled 
with worldwide dispersion of fissile materials, were then 
thought to be sufficient to assure success in preventing the 
fabrication of nuclear weapons.10 
The Soviet response was rejection in the form of unaccepta-
ble counterproposals.u Given the apparent unilateral control 
of the United States of America over atomic energy at this 
time,12 it was 'not surprising that the American recourse to 
achieve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation was domestic 
legislation. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,18 in effect, denied 
the world free access to American nuclear materials and tech-
nology.14 This approach unfortunately included denial of peace-
ful uses of atomic energy to the world, including underde-
"423 Int'l Conciliation 338 (1946). A letter by the Board of Consultants to the 
U. S. representative to the U.N.A.E.C. of May 29, 1946 discussed IADA structure 
and goals. I For. ReI., op. cit. 790 (1946). 
10 423 Int'l Conciliation 343. For a general view of the U. S. position on safe-
guards then, Bee United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, United States Delega-
tion Position Paper (London: January 1946), "The Question of Stages," I For. 
ReI. op. cit. 725 (1946). 
11 Three separate Soviet proposals put forth their position at that time. Moscow 
Resolution' on the Atomic Energy Commission, the Communique of the Moscow 
Tripartite Conference of Foreign Ministers, December, 1945 (U.K., U.S.A., and 
U.S.S.R.), contained in II Foreign Relations of the United States 815 (1945). 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov's proposal to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, printed in I For. ReI. op. cit. 973 (1946). Soviet U.N. Ambassador Gro-
myko presented a Draft Convention to the U.N.A.E.C. 011'. Rec. 23-30 (June 29, 
1946), reprinted in 423 Int'l Conciliation 371 (1946). All proposals called for 
immediate disarmament without inspection. For an analysis of the Molotov pro-
posal by Undersecretary of State Acheson, Bee I For. ReI. op. cit. 1001 (1946). 
ct. British objections to the Baruch Plan, I Foreign Relations of the United States 
519-524, (1947). 
12 I Foreign Relations, op. cit., 956 (1946). Id. at 974; I Foreign Relations of 
the United States 583 (1947). 
18 Act August 1,1946, 60 Stat. 755, c. 724. 
14 Although § 8 of the Act permitted the government to supercede its provisions 
by treaty, this was not done. § 5 restricted export of special (fissile), souree and 
byproduct nuclear materials except pursuant to a U.S.A.E.C. determination of non-
weapons potential. § 6 prohibited export of equipment or devices using atomic 
energy as a weapon, and § 10(a) (1) prohibited the exchange of information on 
uses of atomic energy for industrial purposes until approved safeguards were in 
e11'eet. In practice, such exchanges were not carried out, even with our strongest 
allies. See the exchange of notes between British Prime Minister Attlee and Presi-
dent Truman, I. For. ReI: op. cit. 1249-1253, 1259 (1946). Also, note to the U. S. 
Ambassador to Beliium, I Foreign Relations of the United States 783-784 (1947). 
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veloped nations which desperately needed cheap energy sources 
to aid them in postwar modernization. Iii After the Soviet Union 
had successfully pursued a nuclear weapons program, Presi-
dent Eisenhower lowered the "Atomic Curtain" somewhat to 
initiate the "Atoms for Peace" program16 in 1951. Domestic 
law, however, did not begin to move to accommodate this inter-
national program until the passage of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954.1'7 
B. Bilateral Treaties 
Both the concept of international control as formulated in 
the Baruch plan and the concept of unilateral control as ex-
pressed by the 1946 Act were to re-emerge during different 
phases of our subsequent arms control efforts. The latter 
approach was aided by the 1954 Act changes,t8 which permitted 
the United States government to conclude bilateral treaties for 
cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy.19 The treaties 
stringently limited the amount of fissile nuclear material ("spe-
Iii J.M.J. SETHNA, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONTROLS AND SANCTIONS CONCERNING 
THE PRODUCTION AND USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY (Bombay: Kothari McDuneil & Co.) 
(1966) pp. 34, 35; Bhabhi, H. J. and Dayal, M., "World energy requirements and 
the economics of nuclear power with special reference to underdeveloped countries," 
p. 1741, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of 
Atomic Energy, New York, 1965. U~N. Doc A/Cont. 28/1, Vol. I, pp.41, 47 (1965). 
16 President Eisenhower first proposed the -plan in a speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 8, 1953, reprifded in 29 Dept. of State Bull. 847, 
no. 756 (December 21,1953). 
1'7 Act of August 4, 1954, 68 Bta~. 921 c. 1073 § 1 et seq. The Act, as amended, 
is now codified in 42 UBC § 2011 et seq. 
IS Note 17, supra. ~ 123 provided more substantial procedures for permitting the 
foreign distribution of materials and equipment 42 U.S.C. ~ 2153 as amended. More-
over, while § 92 still prohibited the export of atomic weapons, § 144(a) of the act 
gave the' executive branch increased authority to transmit restricted data related 
to nuclear weapons fabrication pursuant to a § 123 agreement. See 1954 USCCAN 
3476·3478 for legislative history of sections of the Act pertaining to international 
relations. 
19 E.g. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy 
with Brazil, August 3, 1955, 6 UST 2583, T.I.A.S. No. 3303. Most agreements on 
atomic energy of this period took this form, e.g., Treaty with Chile, August 8, 
1955, 6 UST 2611, T.I.A.S. No. 3306; Treaty with Greece, August 4, 1955, 6 UST 
2635, T.I.A.S. No. 3310; Treaty with Denmark, July 25,1955,6 UST 2629, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3309. 
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cial nuclear material" 20) a nation receiving such material could 
keep,21 and provided for an American veto of subsequent trans-
fers of such material and/or equipment by receiving parties-
nations,22 and for an American right to reclaim any spent 
materials.23 Conclusion of such treaties, and the regulation of 
exports thereunder, were among authorities granted to the 
United States Atomic Energy Commission.2• 
C. IAEA 
The Baruch Plan was palely reflected in the creation of the 
International Atomic Energy AgencTIi in 1956. The IAEA, 
an independent, non-aligned organization,28 was authorized to 
2042 USC ~ 2014(aa). 
21 In the 1955 Civil Use Cooperation Agreements, see note 19, supra, the amount 
of enriched isotope U-235 was limited to 6 kilograms by Article lIB, with enrich· 
ment limited to 20%. The United States A.E.C. had discretion to increase this 
amount, subject to the standards of Article lIB, i.e. amounts needed for efficient 
operation during cooling cycles or interims of fuel element transport. See, fI.g., 
Cooperation Agreement with Greece, August 4, 1955, 6 UST 2635, 2636, T.I.A.S. 
No. 3310. 
22 The procedure was as follows: Under Article IIA of an agreement, the 
U.S.A.E.C: leased materials to the foreign government. The same article required 
consultation with the U.S.A.E.C. before the lessee government authorized use of ma-
terials by private citizens. Technology and equipment transfers were authorized by 
Articles I and III, and subsequent transfers to private citizens by Article IV. Trans-
fers outside the foreign nation were prohibited by Article VII unless authorized by 
the U.S.A.E.C. 8ee, e.g., Cooperation Agreement with Brazil, supra note 19. 
23 E.g. Agreement for Cooperation with Denmark, July 25, 1955, art. lIe, 6 
UST 2629, 2630, T.I.A.S. No. 3309 which provided in pertinent part: "when any 
fuel elements containing U-235 leased by the Commission require replacement, they 
shaH be returned to the Commission." To prevent circumvention of the term 
"require replacement" through the use of irradiation or reprocessing, the article 
further provided: II except as may be agreed, the form and content of the irradiated 
fuel elements shall not be altered after their removal from the reactor." 
2.52 USC §§ 2073(a), 2074, 2077, 2094, 2112, 2121(c), 2133, 2134, 2153 and 
2164, as amended (1970). 
25 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, October 26, 1956, 8 UST 
1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 UNTS 3 (Entered into force July 29, 1957): Ratified, 
85th Cong., 1st sess., 103 Congo Ree. 8267 (1957) [hereinafter cited as IAEA 
Statute]. For American participation authority see Act of August 28, 1957, 72 
Stat. 453. P.L. 85-177 § 2, as amended c. 28 of title 22 USC. For legislative history 
see 1957 USCCAN 1645. For the report of the chairman of the U.S. delegation to 
the Conference on the IAEA Statute, see 1957 USCCAN 1104. 
26 Article IIIc of the IAEA Statute reads in pertinent part: II In carrying out 
its functions, the Agency shaH not make assistance to members subject to any 
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develop and disburse nuclear technology and resources" to 
nations under a system of safeguards, designed by the agency28 
to prevent the use of materials by or within a receiving 
nation for the development of nuclear weapons.29 Licensing 
of projects would be based on adequate assurances of co-
operation with monitoring and reporting procedures, rather 
than on international ownership as under the Baruch Plan.so 
Improvements in short-range delivery systems for nuclear 
weapons, and the increase in the numbers of nuclear weapons 
here and in the Soviet Union led to a race to deploy these 
weapons during the cold war of the late fifties. The regional 
alliance of NATO required joint defense planning, hence a 
modification of our treaty structure with Europe.81 Since our 
treaty structure was bilateral, rights and obligations were 
readily changed.82 The United States commitment to IAEA 
involved no substantial duties, since contribution was not 
mandatory, and the United States had no need of IAEA 
assistance. Legislation was passed to amend domestic laws,1I 
politieal, economic, military or other conditions incompatible with the provisions of 
this statute." 8 UST 1097. 
2T Unlike the IADA, the IAEA does not own all nuclear materials. Bupply of 
material8 i8 voluntary, IAEA Statute Art. IX, 8 UST 1102 (1956). Its efforts 
are more those of a "broker" of nuclear technology and material transfers, id. 
Art. IIIA(1), 8 UST 1095; id., Art. XI C, 8 UST 1104 (1956). 
28 ld., Article XII, 8 UST1105 (1956). The agency must approve equipment and 
facility design subject to requirements of safeguard application and approve chemieal 
processing means to ensure no diversion of material8 for military purposes. 
29 ld., IAEA inspectors have both the right (sub8ection A(6» and the respon8i· 
bility (section C) to ascertain whether Agency projects are being u8ed for military 
purpose8; w., Article XI(F) (4),8 UST 1105. 
80 423 Int'l Conciliation 338,342 (1946). See note 27, 8'Upra. 
81 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation 
Regarding Atomic Information, June 22, 1955, 7 UST 397, T.I.A.B. No. 3521 
(Entered into force March 29, 1956). 
82Id., Article II(2) provides in part: "Information will not be tran8ferred by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to unauthorized per80n8 or beyond the 
jurisdiction of that Organization. . ." 7 UST 401. 
88 Act of July 2, 1958, P. L. 85-479, 72 Stat. 278 amended § 2121 of 42 USC, non-
nuclear weapons parts and materials could be transferred only to nation8 which had 
already made substantial progress in the development of nuclear weapons. 42 USC 
2121(c)(1), (4). See, e.g., Treaty with Germany for cooperation on the Uses of 
Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, May 5, 1959, 10 UST 1322, T.r.A.B. 
No. 4276 (entered into force July 27,1956). 
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and permit bilateral treaties authorizing the sale or transfer 
of non-explosive nuclear weapons technology and fuels to 
NATO allies. Even restricted data on atomic weapons was 
subject to sharing on a limited basis.s4 Almost as if parallelism 
dictated, American support to the IAEA increased. The ma-
terials donation that followed ratification of the IAEA statute811 
had been ineffective; America still had a virtual monopoly on 
the facilities utilizing such materials. In the sixties, though, 
the United States agreed by treaty to subject certain non-
military facilities to Agency controls.s8 
D. Internationalization of Control Efforts via Trilateral 
Treaties. 
Thus far, the international control approach, represented by 
the IAEA, and the unilateral approach of the American treaty 
system had been separate; the next step was the commingling 
of these approaches with the signing of a trilateral treaty be-
tween the IAEA, United States of America and Japan.S7 The 
treaty transferred safeguards rights and duties from the 
United' States to the IAEA,88 and suspended United States 
3442 usc 2164(c)(I). 
SII Act of August 28, 1957, P.L. 85·177 ~ 7, 71 Stat. 455 authorized distribution by 
the Commission of 5000 kg. of contained U·235, 500 g. U·233, and 3 kg. plutonium 
plus matching amounts of special materials contributed by all other members up 
to July 1, 1960, pursuant to a ~ 123 agreement. 42 USC 2074, as amended; the 
authorization was implemented in 1959, see Agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for Cooperation in the Peaceful Application of Atomic Energy, 
May 11, 1959, Art. lIa, 10 UST 1424, 1425, T.I.A.S. No. 4291. (Entered into 
force August 7, 1959). 
38 Agreement with the IAEA for the application of Agency Safeguards to Four 
U.S. Reactor facilities, March 30, 1962, 13 UST 415, T.I.A.S. No. 5002, (effective 
June 1, 1962). Later modified and extended, June 15, 1964, 15 UST 1456, T.I.A.S. 
No. 5621 (effective August 1,1964). 
37 Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and Japan for the 
Application of Safeguards by the Agency to the Bilateral Agreement between Japan 
and the United States of America concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, Septem· 
ber 23, 1963, 14 UST 1265, T.I.A.S. No. 5429 (effective November 1, 1963). See 
Gorove, "Transferring U ,So Bilateral Safeguards," 6 Duquesne L. Rev. 1 (1967). 
88 Agreement with the IAEA and Japan, id., Article I § 3, 14 UST 1266 (1963). 
204 BOSTON CoLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & CoKPARATIVlIl LAW JOtl'BNAL [Vol. 1, No.1 
safeguard procedures while the IAEA safeguards, which re-
placed them, were in operation.s9 
Perhaps the most interesting provision of the treaty was 
that which provided for arbitration in the event of a disagree-
ment among the parties concerning the agreement or its appli-
cations!O Assuming the validity of the agreement/1 it appeared 
to resolve the difficult issues respecting breach of a multi-
partite agreement. Would any safeguards exist in the event 
of a breach,f2 and if so, whose, and by which party would they 
89 Id., Article I § 5, 14 UST 1267 (1962) provides: "The United States agrees 
that the rights provided to it by Article IX of the Agreement for cooperation will 
be suspended with respect to any equipment, devices and materials while they are 
listed in the inventory provided for in annex A" (to which Agency safeguards are 
applied-see n. 38). 
40 Id., Article VI § 20, 14 UST 1271 provides that, for any dispute of any nature 
"arising out of the interpretation or application of this agreement," either negotia· 
tion or any other agreed method may first be used to settIe the dispute. If these 
methods fail, the dispute ill submitted to an arbitral tribunal according to the pro-
cedures of § 20. 
f1 The important factor in this respect seems to be the express authorization in 
the statute of conclusion by the IAEA of such treaties. IAEA statute, Articles 
II(A)(6) and II(B)(l), 8 UST 1093, 1096 (1956). CHIU, CAPACITY OJ' INTERNA-
TIONAL OBGANIZATIONS TO CONCLUDE TREATIES AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OJ' 
THE TREATIES so CONCLUDED. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) pp. 374-385 (1966). 
See also G. Hartmann, "The 'Capacity of International Organizations to Conclude 
Treaties," in K. ZEKANEK, (ED.), AGREEKENTS OJ' INTERNATIONAL OBQANIZATIONS 
AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW AND TREATIES, (New York: Springer-
Verlag) pp. 127, 151·163 (1971). 
f2 Article 27(b), Harvard Research on International Law, 29 AJIL Supp. 1094 
(1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research] permits provisional suspensions of 
obligations by the aggrieved party following a breach. Breach is defined in Article 
29(a), id., p. 1077, as failure of a party to perform its obligations in good faith. 
However, a breach relating to supply questions might be separable from the safe-
guards question. Id., Article 30, p. 1134. Presumably the continuance of safeguards 
would not damage the aggrieved party, which appears to be the rationale of Article 
29(b). Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 63 AJIL 875 
(1969) U. N. Doc A/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Conven-
tion] does not apply to treaties with parties not states, id. Article 3, p. 876, the 
theory of breach in Article 60 is helpful. Article 60, section 2 (b), 63 AJIL 893 
provides "a party (to a multilateral treaty) specially affected by (a) breach (may) 
invoke it 88 a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty in whole or in part 
in the relations between itself and the defaulting state." Thus, under this ap-
proach IAEA safeguards would survive a U.S. breach and U.S. safeguards an IAEA 
breach. McNair states that a breach is to be determined by the measurement of 
the good faith efforts to comply, where acts are not expressly prohibited by the 
agreement. McNair, Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon PreBS) p. 540 (1961). 
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be administered 7 Would a breach of IAEA safeguards create 
any right to remedies in the United States, and what, if any, 
would be those rights 743 What would be the effect of a J apa-
nese declaration invoking rebus sic stantibus" to amend its 
duties or terminate the safeguards 745 Although the ubiquity 
of quantitative and procedural restrictions on the transferred 
materials would probably suffice to show that any lapse in the 
IAEA safeguards would entitle the United States to reclaim 
its materials,46 the arbitration clause removes uncertainty4T in 
an area where uncertainty is anathema. 
43 Harvard Research 1092 says yes; provisional suspension would be the right 
accorded, id. p. 1089. The Vienna Convention, AI·ticle 60(2), though expressly not 
applicable, 8upra, note 42, accords the same right. McNair, op. cit. 570, 571 writes 
that the right to abrogate depends on the materiality of the breach, exercise of the 
right manifestly, absence of waiver respecting the breach, separability of breached 
provisions from the rest of the agreement and present harm or injury to the party 
exercising the right. All factors appear to be present for exercise here. 
"Also called claU8ula rebu8 sic stantibus. Literally, "with things standing so," 
the term refers to the doctrine of changed circumstances. This doctrine teaches that 
treaties derive their force from the mutuality of interest they embody. When a 
fundamental change occurs which terminates the interest of one of the Parties 
to the treaty, that Party has the right to modify or abrogate the treaty, if that 
interest was a tacit condition of the treaty, 5 Moore, Digest of Int'l Law 319 
(Washington, 1906); Harvard Research, Art. 28(a), pp. 1096, 1100, Vienna Con-
vention Art. 62(1), p. 894. This is distinguished from a change of circumstance 
rendering performance impossible. This basis for invalidating a treaty refers to an 
error on the part of the States pa,rties as to possibility of performance. Harvard 
Research Art. 29, p. 1126; Vienna Convention Art. 48, p. 890. Rebus sic stantibus, by 
making certaiu circumstances tacit conditions of treaties, seems to imply that a 
State cannot bind itself to its own serious detriment, even though performance is 
possible in fact. Harvard Research 1101. Whether a circumstance is a treaty con· 
dition may depend on a broader cOllsideration of the goals of the treaty, and the 
benefits obtained thereby, as against the fact of a detrimental change in circum-
stances. See Gex Case, infra, notes 61 and 62 and accompanying text. The change 
must affect the raison d 'etre of the treaty. McNair, op. cit. 685. S,ee also 14 White-
man, International Law § 40, p. 478 (Dept. of State Pub. No. 8547, September, 
1970). Vienna Convention, Article 62 (1) (a) , p. 894. 
411 Given the commitment to safeguards embodied in the NPT, see, infra, note 54, 
it is hard to argue that those same safeguards are a quid pro quo of any supply 
agreement. Infra, note 61. 
46 E.g. Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement with Japan, June 16, 1958, Articles 
V, VII, 9 UST. 1383, 1385-7, T.I.A.S. No. 4133 (effective December 5, 1958). 
47 The breadth of applicability of the arbitration procedure is especially useful, 
see note 40, 8'ltpra. 
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Of course, domestic regulation was still felt throughout the 
cooperative effort. Even with respect to safeguards, the United 
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), as agent for the 
United States, had implicit regulatory control over safe-
guards." 
E. Open Treaties 
The treaty . approach, which until the early sixties had re-
flected the American desire to unilaterally control nuclear pro-
liferation, continued to adopt the more "international, Baruch-
Plan" type of approach with the use of "open" treaties. At 
first, such treaties were of two types. One was designed to 
prevent deployment of nuclear weapons in new areas, thus re-
ducing the access of non-nuclear weapon nations to them. Of 
this type was the Antarctic Treaty." No conflicts arose with 
respect to this treaty because Antarctica was not a strategic 
site for nuclear weapons, and we had no treaty commitments 
for the placement of nuclear weapons there. 
The second type was the limited test ban treaty.GO It was a 
direct non-proliferation measure; the cost of underground test-
ing for nations without facilities or land area . suitable for 
preparation is prohibitive.G1 Effectively,' nations other than 
the superpowers were committing themselves not to develop 
reliable atomic arsenals. 
"B.g. Article VII, • 22 of the IAEA· U. B.· JAPAN treaty 01'. cit. p. 1272 
required U.s. approval (i.e. Agency appl'oval) before any changes to the IAEA 
safeguards could be implemented. Agency authority over equipment and materiala 
not in Annex A of the agreement continued pursuant to Artiele 2 of the bilateral 
agreement, cited '" note 46, ft".a, 9UBT 1384. 
48 Biped, December I, 1959, 12 UBT 794, T.I.A.B. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.B. 71 
(effective June 23, 1961) eap. Artiele I, 12 UBT 795 and Article V 12 UBT 796 pro-
hibiting testing of nuclear weaponl. For a list of signatories as of 1976, ,ee Arms 
Control Report, U. B. Arms Control and Disarmament Ageney, pp. 68-71 (1976) 
(hereinafter cited as.A,."., Co"trol Beport). 
IIOBigned, August 5, 1963, 14 trST 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 UNTB 48 
(effective Oetober 10, 1963). . 
Gl B.g. ,the cost of preparing the Amehitka test Bite W8I reported to be between 
.110 and ,130 million. 86ft(Jte Hearing" COfMrlittee Oft Foreig" BelatiOftl, 0" 8J. 
B,. 166, 91st Cong., 1st sea., September 29, 1969, p. 86. 
1977) TREATY CoNS'Iltt:TION 207 
Subsequent open treaties of the first type have been more 
readily negotiated, mainly because the deployment or nonde-
ployment of weapons in international areas, such as Outer 
Space52 and the Sea Bed,G8 involves fewer conflicts with treaty 
laws and obligations. 
It is somewhat surprising that the superpowers were able 
to successfully negotiate for, and agree to, the N on-
Proliferation Treaty.c'4 The political objectives inherent in the 
negotiations were obviously understood by all parties.1III For 
instance, the Soviet Union proposed that the treaty incorporate 
a non-deployment provision, restricting nuclear weapons to 
the nuclear-weapon state.1i6 Although the provision would not 
conflict with any express provisions of our defense treaties, 
1i2 Treaty of Principles Goveming the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 UST 2410, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 54 AJIL 477, January 27, 1967. Article IV provides: "States 
Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects 
earrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install 
such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer spaee in &D;r 
other mauner." Id. p. 2413. 
G8 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Implacement of Nuclear Weapons and other 
weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea.bed and the Ocean Floor and in the, Sub· 
soil thereof, February 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337, (effective May 
18,1972). 
54 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, JUly 1, 1968, 21 UST 
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, U.N. Doc A (Res) 2373 (XXII) Annex U.N. Doc 
A/7016/ Add. 1, (effective March 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NPT]. For cur-
rent list of signatories, see Arms Control Report 68-71 (1976). 
l1li Hearinga b,efore the Committee on Foreign Relationa, United 8tatel 8enate, 
on the NPT, 9Ist Cong., 1st seSB. (part 1, 1968; part 2, 1969) (hereinafter cited 
as NPT hearings); U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Intemational 
Negotiations on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Pub. no. 
48, (Washington: GPO, 1969) (hereinafter cited as USAC & DA, NPT Negotia-
tions); M. WILLRIClI, NPT: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CON'l"ROL (Charlottes-
ville, Va.: The Michie Company) pp. 61·63 (1969); E. Firmage, The Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 63 AJIL 711, 716-721 (1969). Political 
pressure for the treaty initiated with the U. N. General Assembly Resolution on 
the "Prevention of the Wider Dissemination of Nuclear Weapons" A/Res/1665 
(XVI) Dec. 5, 1961,16 UNGAOR 807 (1961). 
58 USAC & DA, NPT Negotiations 33, 38-40; Willrich, Ope cit. 71-72; Firmage, 
op. cit. 716. 
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which do not require deployment of atomic weapons,IIT it would 
significantly affect understandings with our allies. The Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT) was 
finally drafted to require only that the nuclear-weapon states 
retain control of such weapons.1IS 
One factor which perhaps facilitated agreement is the tenta-
tive nature of the commitment to the NPT as defined ·by Article 
X.1I9 This article provides that a party may withdraw on notice 
if the supreme national interest of the party requires. Senate 
hearings on the NPT indicateeo that it is uncertain what such 
an exigency might be. Although the United States government 
might feel that it is in our best interest to maintain a vague 
bolt-hole from the treaty, a contrary view is possible. It is 
submitted that removal of ambiguities might be the next step 
in the evolution of international controls. A draft convention 
of principals would make the legal rights of the states - parties 
to the NPT more effective in the event of an attempted exer-
cise of Article X .. Judicial scrutiny would be possible. An 
analogy can be drawn to the case of Free Zones of Upper 
Savoy and the District of Gex.1l1 There the doctrine of rebus 
sic stantibus was raised by France as a defense to her abroga-
tion of a customs treaty. The Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice found that the circumstances which led to the 
liT B.g. Security Treaty with Australia and New Zealand, September 1, 1951, 3 
UBT 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493, (eft'ective April 29, 1952), Article IV, id. p. 3423, 
simply obligates eaeh party to "aet to meet the common danger" of an attack in 
the Pae11le on any party, "in accordance with its constitutional proceSBes." 
118 NPT Articles I and II, 21 .UST 487, use a "control" standard rather than 
the Soviet "BeCeSB" standard. Article I provides in part: "Eaeh nuclear weapons 
Irtate party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or 
explosive devices directly, or indirectly .•. "; NPT hearings 159-161, 219. 
119 NPT, Article X(I), 21 UST 493 provides: "Each party shan in exercising 
Its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it decides 
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized 
the supreme interests of its country ..• ". 
eo NPT hearings, 78,367-368 (1968,1969). 
1I1PCIJ Ser. AlB, No. 46 (June 7,1932) p. 96; 2 Hudson, World Court Reports 
448 (1935). 
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agreement had not changed, because nothing in the treaty indi-
cated that the circumstance which had changed, i.e. the exist-
ence of a free trade zone in Geneva, had been the quid pro quo 
of the agreement.62 
From a purely organizational viewpoint, the application of 
NPT requirements has been simple. All nations with whom we 
have nuclear energy agreements are now subject to IAEA 
safeguards in one manner or another, with one exception.t111 
Some nations are bound by the NPT to utilize IAEA safe-
guards, and have so agreed.64 Others are still parties to 
trilateral IAEA-United States-third party agreements, trans-
ferring safeguards duties to the IAEA.611 Only Italy, which 
awaits resolution of the IAEA-Euratom negotiations, is not 
receiving United States aid pursuant to IAEA safeguards.68 
Although we have integrated our bilateral treaty approach 
with a multipartite "international" treaty system smoothly in 
the mechanical sense, several policy questions are raised in the 
next sections, before attempting to determine the next organic 
needs of the multipartite treaty structure as determined by 
the principles of treaty law. 
62 Id., p. 156. 
63 Appendices H-2, H-3, JCAE2d 178-179 (1976). Eleven treaties implement 
IAEA safeguards pursuant to the principles of the NPT; fifteen trilateral treaties 
transfer safeguards application from U. S. to IAEA. Italy currently operates under 
safeguards provided by a bilateral agreement of cooperation, but is in the process 
of bringing into force, with other non-nuclear weapons states in Europe, an agree-
ment for IAEA verification of Euratom safeguards. IAEA and Euratom safeguards 
are comparable currently, in the view of some persons. See NPT hearings 106 (1968). 
64 E.g. Agreement for application of IAEA safeguards to the cooperation agree-
ment with Austria, August 20, 1969, 21 UST 56, TIAS No. 6816 (effective January 
24, 1970). In cases such as this, the NPT agreement of the parties forms part of 
the context for construing right.s and obligations of the parties. Harvard Research 
Article 19(a), p. 970; Vienna Convention, Article 31, p. 885. 
65 E.g. Agreement for Application of IAEA safeguards between IAEA, Japan 
and the United States, July 10, 1968, 19 UST 5371, T.I.A.S. No. 6520. 
66 Although formal agreement has not been reached, Italy is a party to the NPT 
and a member of Euratom and IAEA. At present U. S. safeguards apply pursuant 
to the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement with Italy, July 22, 1959, 12 UST 170, 
T.I.A.S. No. 4689, (effective March 30, 196]). Presumably, some joint Euratom/ 
IAEA safeguards system can be worked out. 
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II. INTEGRATION OF EXISTING PROCEDURES 
A. Supply of nuclear materials. 
Should the nuclear fuel requirements of the non-nuclear 
weapons states be considered a quid pro quo of the present 
agreements not to acquire nuclear weapons' Under the bi-
lateral treaty structure, supply was specifically determined 
during negotiations with the nuclear material supplier (United 
States) .67 Article IV of the NPT68 appears to alter this some-
what by imposing a general duty of supply on nuclear weapons 
states. The United States' opinion, as expressed by a chairman 
of the U. S. A. E. C. is that this imposes no obligation of sup-
port absent negotiations of the former kind.69 However, there 
might be a question as to the right to terminate supply obliga-
tions absent substantial treaty violations, using Article IV(2) 
as a source of independent obligation once supply has begun 
pursuant to a treaty of co-operation.70 
67 E.g. Agreement for Cooperation in Civil Uses of Atomic Energy with Portugal, 
May 16, 1974, 25 UST 1125, T.I.A.S. No. 7844, (effective June 26, 1974). Article 
VIII, ill. p. ll33 limits the overall quantity to amounts sufficient for the peaceful 
uses pursued by Portugal. To further limit the transfer of weapons-grade materials, 
the supplied material may not exceed 20% U-235 in content. 
68 NPT, Article IV, 21 UST 483, 489 provides: "All the Parties to the Treaty 
undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and te'.lhnological information for 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy." 
69 Dr. Seaborg stated: "We do not interpret Article IV •.. as obliging the 
United States to meet all requests or demands .•. The parties will be expected to 
cooperate only to the extent that they are in a position to do so, and .•. reciprocity 
may well be a factor •.. " Hearings on the Military Implications of the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon.s, U. S. Senate Armed Services Comm., 
91st Cong., 1st sess., p. 86 (Feb. 27, 1969). 
70 Rights and remedies for a breach of the NPT are not articulated in the treaty. 
Presumably, since safeguards of materials a.re committed to the IAEA, nuclear 
weapons-states parties must wait for the non-nuclear weapon state to be declared in 
violation of safeguards or treaty purposes before action can be taken. While the 
United States might claim that duty to supply arises from the bilateral treaty, and 
that, when this is abrogated for breach, or suspended, there is no basis for a claim 
of breach of Article IV. However, since the IAEA also supervises safeguards of 
bilateral treaty materials pursuant to trilateral treaties or other treaties with IAEA, 
it does not appear that the United States could suspend material transfers without 
first claiming a breach of duty by the IAEA and suspending that organization's 
safeguards control. So Article IV, together with the NPT requirement of IAEA 
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B. NPT as a Uniform Nuclear Oode - definitional problems. 
The United States Congress is presently confused about the 
proper method for licensing and regulating nuclear commerce.71 
For instance, what might occur if Congress asserts a legisla-
tive prerogative to intervene in, and cut off, the export of 
nuclear material to a nation which it feels is violating duties 
owed. to the United Statesy72 Presumably, our "breach"" 
would not release the other nation from a duty to comply with 
NPT requirements in any subsequent arrangements it made,''' 
even with non-party states.711 Would our determination of a 
violation have any binding force f Since the IAEA is in charge 
of safeguards, determinations in that respect would seem to 
be non-binding. As was noted earlier,76 the United States might 
charge the IAEA with failure to carry out its obligations 
properly, or allege that the NPT violation is occurring with 
respect to non-regulated, "home-grown" facilities and ma-
terials. In the first case, a claim is made which is not within 
the express control of the states parties, and so might be 
aafeguards application, might create an obligation to supply, once begun pursuant 
to separate agreement. 
71 Although Congre8s may have a clear view of what it wishes to accomplish, its 
. view may be unrealistic. See, e.g., Nuolear Commeroe 927. 
72 Ia., pp. 944-945 and footnotes. 
78 Municipal law is not a defense to the failure to perform treaty obligations on 
interna:tions1 law. 5 Moore, Dige8t of International Law, p. 365 (1906); Harvard 
Research Art. 23, p. 662; Vienna Convention Art. 27, p. 884; 14 Whiteman, Interna~ 
tional Law 290 (1970). 
14 Multipartite treaties create obligations to every state-party, 80 a breach by the 
U.S. would not relieve an aggrieved party from its duties under the NPT with re-
spect to safeguards or the non-development of atomic weapons. Vienna Convention 
Art. 60(2), p. 893; Art. II, NPT, 21 UST 487. A breach which affects a central 
interest of all parties to the treaty, however, may allow the affected parties to 
withdraw unilaterally from the treaty, ending all obligations. 14 Whiteman, Inter-
national Law 475 (1970). 
711 A treaty cannot be made under present principles of international law which 
abrogates a treaty with a state not party to the subsequent treaty or eliminates 
duties owed under the former treaty to such a state. 14 Whiteman, International 
Law 348-349 (1970); Vienna Convention Art. 41, p. 888; Harvard Research Art. 
22(b) p.661. 
76 See note 70, 8'Upra. 
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binding pending an agreed-upon review.'7T Such a claim would 
be so potentially damaging to both IAEA78 and the NPT it-
self,79 that it should not be lightly made. The latter claim would 
simply involve the states parties in a determination of its 
validity. It would seem to leave the NPT intact, and so 
require other nuclear weapon states-parties to be careful about 
stepping in as supplier. Although not specifically binding on 
states not party to the bilateral or trilateral supply agree-
ment,80 the NPT could create an obligation not to supply for 
such parties even though arising out of other transactions.81 
This might be applicable, for instance, to the acquisition of 
'7T Since the trilateral treaty system leaves intact the earlier bilateral treaties 
under which supplies are transferred, a determination by the U. S. that IAEA safe-
guards had not been properly applied could lead the U. S. to suspension of the 
trilateral treaty and application of American safeguards. See, e.g. IAEA - U.S.-
India Agreement for application of IAEA Safeguards, January 27, 1971, • 4, 
22 UST 200, 201, T.I.A.S. No. 7049. The counterargument that IAEA safeguards 
alone are applieable to supply, under NPT Art. III § 1, 21 UST 489, seems to fail 
beeauae such agreements are under the Statute, which provides for dispute, Art. 
XVII, IAEA Statute, 8 UST ll10 (1956). This article calls for resolution by the 
I.C.J. if all else fails. American provisional suspension of supplies or application 
of American safeguards would not be material, permitting the "aggrieved party" 
to abrogate its own obligations to accept U. S. safeguards under the bilateral treaty, 
or seek resolution in the Court. Of course, in the latter case the Court could 
presumably make an American determination fully binding, if it determined that 
this was needed to preserve jurisdiction. Art. 41, Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, June 26, 1945. Series D, No.1, Acts and Documents Concerning the 
Organization of the Court. (Leyden, Holland: A. W. Sijthoff, May, 1947). This 
would depend on the Court's jurisdiction over the parties, that is, whether Art. 
XVII of the IAEA statute invoked full ICJ powers even in the face of a reservation 
to the ICJ statute, e.g., U. S. declaration, 30 Y.B. of the I.C.J. 80 (1975-6). 
78IAEA exists through the voluntary association of other nations. It has no 
internally generated funds. They are assessed by the General Conference, IAEA 
Statute, Art. XIV (d) 8 UST ll08, ll09. Its equipment is solicited, see note 25, 
supra, and much of its services before the NPT depended on the efficiency of its 
operations. Although the NPT requires IAEA safeguards, that guarantee of support 
is only as strong as the above source of operating funds and the NPT itself. See 
note 79, infra. 
79 The NPT's obligations are always subject to Article X provisions, see note 
59, supra. 
80 See note 75, 8tlpra. 
81 This is the inverse of the text accompanying the preceding footnote. See note 
75, supra. In other words, it is submitted that good faith performance of NPT 
obligations may require inquiry into whether an alleged violation of the other treaty 
would, if factual, constitute a violation of the NPT by the non-nuclear-weapon state. 
Bee note 86, infra. 
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"reprocessing facilities" 82 by non-nuclear weapon states, if 
our bilateral agreements were to incorporate the definition of 
such facilities as illegal under the NPT.88 
C. Agreements by Non-Nuclear Weapon States. 
Several problems are associated with the limitation of de-
ployment in non-nuclear weapon states. Problems arising from 
agreements made by nuclear weapon states inter sese, which 
result in limiting such deployment, are discussed, infra. With 
respect to agreements made with or among non-nuclear weapon 
states, two approaches create two problems. 
The recent treaty with Spain for the lease of foreign bases'" 
provides for the removal of American nuclear weapons from 
Spain.83 While it might be taken to prevent Spanish with-
drawal from NPT obligations in the event of American reduc-
tion of its deployment elsewhere, this is by no means clear. 
Such agreements might be leading to a "Scylla and Charybdis" 
situation in which non-nuclear weapons states all agree to 
prohibit deployment within their states, while requiring an 
American defense commitment and viewing other reductions 
in deployment as a threat to their nation. Perhaps in the event 
of general, widespread conclusion of agreements there would 
be presented an obstacle to such a self-serving approach to the 
NPT treaty.88 
82 Reprocessing involves separation of plutonium and unused uranium fissile ma-
terials from speut reactor fuel cores. Arms Control Report, Pub. No. 89, USAC & 
DA, 23-25 (July, 1976). Also Annex I, IAEA safeguards document, INFCIRC/66 
Rev.S, (September 16,1968) p.18. 
83 Parties may create further obligations between themselves such as this, not 
inconsistent with 9bligations to other states. Vienna Convention, Art. 41, p. 888; 
Harvard Research Art. S2, op. cit. pp. 661, 1016, 1024. 
Also, they may create obligations with respect to third parties not party to the 
treaty creating those obligations. Vienna Convention Art. 36, p. 886; Harvard Re-
search Art. 18(b), p. 924. 14 Whiteman, International Law 347 (1970). 
84 JCAE 2d 2 (1976). New York Times, p. 5, col. 1 (January 25,1976). 
83 New York Times, id. The treaty called for removal of all Poseidon nuclear 
submarines, and the American stockpile of nuclear weapons, by 1979. 
88 Generally, treaties must be complied with in good faith. See, B.g. Vienna Con-
vention, Art. 26, p. 884. 
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Another approach has been the creation of "nuclear free" 
zones, within which nuclear weapons are not to be manufac-
tured or otherwise deployed. One instance of this is the Latin 
American nuclear free zone, ("LANFZ") created by the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco.8T The problem here is definitional; the 
treaty permits the development and use within the zone of 
"peaceful nuclear explosives.,'88 Presumably, these devices 
are distinguished from atomic weapons solely by the title and 
the lack of a military delivery vehicle. That this distinction 
has real importance is indicated by the declaration of Brazil in 
connection with its ratification of the treaty.- The NPT pro-
vides no help, since it also provides for the development and 
use of such devices." 
D. NucZear WeapoA8 States Agreements and their Nth Natio. 
effects. 
The unilateral or superpower side of the two-pronged Ameri-
can approach could damage the NPT's effectiveness in two 
ways. First, there are nations which view the NPT as a scheme 
81 634 UNTS 281, No. 9068, February 14, 1967. Protocol n, in which nuclear 
weapon states outside the zone agreed to respect it, was signed by the United States 
on April I, 1968. 634 UNTS 364, with an appended statement, 634 UNTS 419. 
88 Article 18 of the treaty· declares in part: "Contracting parties may carry out 
explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes - including explosions which 
involve devices similar to those used in nuclear weapons - or collaborate with third 
parties for the same purpose. " 634 UNTS 346. 
89 634 UNTS 416. 
90 NPT, Art. V, 21 UST 490 provides: Each party to the treaty undertakes to 
take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under 
appropriate international observation and through appropriate international pro· 
cedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosiolll 
will be made available to non·nuclear·weapon States Party to the Treaty on a 
non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive 
devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and de-
velopment. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain 
IUch benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through 
an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-
weapon States. N egotiationa on this subject shall commence as soon as posaible 
after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty 
10 desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements. 
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for nuclear oligopoly by the superpowers.91 Further super-
power agreements can only enhance such a view, and support 
the use of Article X to pull out of the treaty at some point 
when the nation has sufficient material, know-how and equip-
ment to enter the arms race. The "Zangger List" 112 and the 
nebulous "understanding" reached at the London Suppliers 
Conference98 may also be jeopardizing a "supreme national 
interest. " An argument is not possible at present to rebut an 
Article X action since each nation makes its own determination 
as to when an Article X "extraordinary" event has occurred.'" 
Even if it is possible to adjudicate Article X actions in the 
future, what would be the defense to a charge of aggression 
or NPT violation based on refusal to supply! Certainly not 
the "understandings" of the suppliers. This would be a claim 
of waiver by the non-nuclear state-party without knowledge of 
what is being waived.91S 
A second problem with superpower agreements relates to 
Article VI of the NPT which requires efforts by nuclear 
weapon states parties to reach an agreement for nuclear dis-
armament." This provision has bothered American officials 
from the time of ratification to the present.IT Some party-
II Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Congo 1st sess., 1st Ann. Rep. on the 
. Development, Use and Control of Nuclear Energy for the Common Defense and 
Security and for Peaceful Purposes, p. 7 (Comm. Print, 1975). Firmage, op. cit. 
63 AJIL 720 (Indian reference to the link between vertical proliferation in produc· 
tion of fissionable materials and the treaty. Vertical proliferation is now uaed to 
refer to the quantitative increase of nuclear weapons among the superpowers. JCAE 
2d 4 (1976). The change in focus probably results from the huge increase in 
production of fissile materials as byproducts of peaceful nuclear activities, primarily 
power reactor operation. JCAE 2d 76 (1976). 
92 NucJear Commerce 952. 
9S Itl. pp. 953·955. New York Times, p. 10, col. 3, 4 (November 22, 1975). 
114 Compare Art. X, note 59, B'Upra, with the more general doctrine ot reb", N 
stantibus note 44, B'Upra. 
95 McNair, op. cit. 553; Harvard Research 1093. 
geNPT, Article VI, 8 UST 490 provides: "Each ot the Parties to the Treaty 
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race s,t an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and 
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna· 
tional control." 
97 At the time ot ratification, concern centered on whether Article VI would 
operate to prohibit development of a new weapons system, i.e. the ABM sllltem. 
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state might prefer to use slowness in the Soviet-American 
negotiations as a breach of the NPT, in order to terminate 
duties thereunder, for instance with respect to facilities not 
subject to control pursuant to other agreements. Use of Article 
VI would be less open to international condemnation than use 
of Article X. The Article VI breach charge could even be 
drawn out into a theory that, by abrogating the NPT, the 
"aggrieved nation" was inducing the superpowers to agree 
more swiftly to disarm and thereby championing the cause of 
international disarmament. 
The flaw with this reasoning is that the breach must be ma-
terial,98 in order to permit withdrawal by the aggrieved party. 
The overwhelming military power of the two superpowers, 
conventional as well as nuclear, would make a claim that dis-
armament was a major consideration for "joining" the treaty 
seem absurd, at least without a long history of failure to 
disarm. 
Other approaches hold forth hope for the future integration 
of efforts. The Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) 
Conferences may reduce tensions between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact in Central Europe." If actual reductions in the 
number of atomic weapons deployed occur, the European na-
tions should be estopped from asserting such events as ap-
propriate for withdrawal from the NPT.l°O 
NPT hearings 348-351. But B. Con. Res. 69 is an example <if Congressional eft'orta 
to meet Article VI requirements. Bee Hearings on S. Con. Bes. 69, 94th Cong., 2d 
sess., (March 18, 1976) p. 4: "Whereas it is important .•• that the position of the 
United Btates Congress be understood with respect to its willingness to give full 
eft'ect to the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and 
to take further steps to limit. nuclear dangers, (proposal to reduce numbers of 
weapons) (from text of S. Con. Res. 69). 
98 See note 42, supra. Under a treaty with a broad arbitration provision, such a 
requirement would not be necessary for remedial action. Note 40 supra. 
"JCAE 2d 19 (1976). As of June, 1976, the Warsaw Pact members had not 
responded to an American proposal to reduce its nuclear force by 1000 weapons in 
return for Soviet removal from Central Europe of 1 tank army, consisting of 69,000 
men and 1700 tanks. However, the Soviet representative has supplied information 
on Warsaw Pact strength for the first time. New York Times, p. 8, col. 8 (June 11, 
1976). 
100 In such a sitnation the states would be agreeing to withdrawal from the entire 
region, see note 83 and aceompanyini text. 
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Soviet-American agreements have no legal effect on "open" 
treaty obligations/O! but, because of the pre-eminence of the 
parties in international politics, may indicate future trends in 
multilateral arms control. Two recent examples of such 
treaties, emerging from the Salt talks, are the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty (TTBT)102 and the Treaty concerning Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions (PNE Treaty).!08 
The former, like the limited test ban treaty, is of importance 
because it would, if generally accepted, limit per se nuclear 
proliferation. The treaty limits tests to 150 kiltons; since 
poorer nations would tend to develop or acquire high yield 
weapons because of a limited delivery capacity, the require-
ments of a threshold treaty would limit arsenals to weapons 
which could be tested.10. 
The latter treaty unfortunately preserves the nominal dis-
tinction between atomic explosives. At the present time there 
is a difference of opinion as to the overall usefulness of PNEs, 
given present non-nuclear engineering techniques.lOIl One ques-
tion that arises is whether the PNE treaty could be extended 
to limit, testing without conflicting with requirements of the 
NPT.108 It is submitted that, at present, a treaty prohibiting 
101 Open treaty obligations are owed to all nations equally. See notes 75 and 75, 
supra. 
102 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Social· 
ist Republics on the limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests. Signed in 
Moscow on July 3, 1974. For text, see the Message from the President of the United 
States transmitting . . . two treaties between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, pp. 1-2 (Washington: GPO, July 29, 1976) 
Protocol Text, W. pp. 3-4. (Cited hereafter as President's Message). 
103 Treaty concerning Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, signed in Washington and 
Moscow on May 28, 1976. 
10. On costs of testing, 8ee note 51 supra. 
1011 Hearing8 on 8. Oon. Re8. 69, p. 51 (1976). The U. S. views PNE devices as 
only marginally useful, but the U. S. S. R. plans large scale engineering projects 
using PNEs. See A. R. W. Wi18on, "Ourrent 8tatus of Oivil Engineering and 
Mineral Resources Development Applications of Peaoeful Nuclear ElI!ploBion8," 7 
Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on tile Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy 211, 218-223, Doc. A/Conf. 49/P/762 (Austria: IAEA, 1972). But as to 
safety considerations, health, environment and physical damage, 8ee, id. pp. 216-
218, and panel discussions, "w. p. 243. 
108 Art. V, NPT, 21 UST 490. 8ee note 90, 8upra. 
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such testing would· breach the ··NPT. A joint understanding 
that PNEs are not useful would be hard to rebut. There would 
then be no "benefit" to be made available. However, such a 
conclusion should be based more on scientific judgment than on 
policy decisions. 
Subject to this constraint, the PNE treaty accomplishes 
several objectives. By providing for verification that the test 
is not used for military purposes,t°T the treaty will stimulate 
discussion and experimentation to produce a definition of 
PNEs. Such a definition may have application to other agree-
ments.10B 
Further, provision in the treaty for access to test sites by 
personnel of the other partylO11 appears to signal a change in 
the long-standing Soviet opposition to on-site inspection.110 
While a treaty cannot change Soviet municipal law,111 it can 
change policies so as to induce accommodation by the Soviets 
of a fundamental American principle of arms control.112 
lOT Art. IV, PNE. Preaident'a Mesaage, 01'. cit. p. 6 (1976). 
108 Such as NPT Art. V or Treaty of Tlatelolco Art. 18. See notes 90, 80 IUprG. 
1011 Art. V, Protocol to the PNE Treaty, President's Mesaage, 01'. cit., pp. 17-19; 
,ee allo JCAE 2d 16 (1976). 
~10 Early Soviet Propolals, note 11, IUpra, contemplated implementation through 
United Nations Organs. This did not comport with American requirementa for 
eftective safeguards. For an example of Soviet streaa on national sovereignty, ,ee 
atatement with Gromyko proposal, 423 International Conciliation 377, 378 (1946). 
111 See ZlLE, SUA&LJ:T AND LOVE, TUE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEK AND ARKS INSPEC-
TION pp. 24-25. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972). Although the Constitution 
of the U. S. S. :8., Art. 18 - a (adopted February 2, 1944) grants republics the right 
to negotiate and "treat with" foreign states separately, the All-Union government 
must sanction exercise of the right, since it controls "international relations" under 
Art. 14-a, id. p. 13. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet ratifies treaties pursuant 
to Art. 49-0 of the U. S. S. R. Constitution id. p. 14, but the Supreme Soviet must 
paaa laws to implement treaties domestically, since under Art. 32 it is the only 
legislative body. 1d. p. 21. Laws of the Presidium pursuant to a treaty would have 
to be ratified ill. pp. 21-22. 
112 Soviet practice appears to be to perform its international obligations "me-
ticulously," ill. p. 28. At the present time Soviet laws would have to be substantially 
revised to accommodate an eftective inspection system. See, e.g., Decree of the 
Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. of April 28, 1956 id. 221-224. (Secrecy law). 
U. S. S. R. Statute on the Protection of the State Frontier of the U. S. S. R., Ved. 
SSSR 1960, no. 34, text 324 (Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the U. S. S. R.: law 
of border aecess). Statute on the Passport System in the U. S. S. R., Art. 4, § 37 
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E. Defensive Nuclear Weapons - a supreme national interest' 
The United States Government has always refused to cate-
gorically prohibit the "first use" of American nuclear weap-
ons.1l8 On the other hand, that government has signed several 
treaties limiting deployment of such weaponslH and recent 
indications are that it will seek an actual reduction in the 
number of deployed weapons.11G Although some nations may be 
pleased with this development, others may view the deployment 
of nuclear weapons within their country as a security commit-
ment against attack. In some countries American nuclear 
armaments are viewed as an integral part of their defense 
planning capability.ll8 With increased concern in Congress 
over adequacy of safeguards in the event of terrorist at-
tacks,117 the possibility of unilateral withdrawal of these weap-
ons cannot be ignored. Such an act appears to invite applica-
tion of Article X's pending a change in some internations legal 
(adopted by decree no. 677, August 28, 1974), XIV Soviet Law and Government 
77 (No.3, 1975-76). 
Still, recent statements by Brezhnev indicate substantial Soviet interest in arms 
control talks. XXIX Current Digest of the Soviet Press 3 (No.3, Feb. 16, 1977). 
But this does not necessarily imply any lessening of Soviet position on national 
sovereignty. See e.g. Voreschetin, "State Sovereignty and Use of Outer Space for 
.d.ppUed Purposes," xv Soviet Laws and Government 76, 80 (No.2, Fall, 1976); 
see also, "Is the West Misinterpreting Detente," XXIX Current Digest of thl' 
Soviet Press 11, 12 (No.7, Ma.rch 16, 1977). 
113 McDowell, Digest of U. S. Practice in International Law in 1975, 800·801 
(Washington, Dept. of State, 1976) (Statements by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
and Secretary of State Kissinger): Both Secretaries of State during the senate 
hearings on NPT ratifica.tion asserted that it did not affect use or nonuse of 
nuclear weapons. NPT hearings 21 (Rusk), 369-370 (Rogers). Cf. Soviet public 
position urging first-use ban, XXIX Current Digest of the Soviet Press 6 (No.3, 
Feb. 10, 1977). 
114 See notes 49, 52, 53,85,87, supra. 
1111 USAC & DA has stated that "the Vladivostok principle of equal aggregate 
levels of strategic offensive armaments represents a major step toward the eventual 
reduction of strategic armaments." Arms Control Report 33 (1976) Bee also S. Con. 
Res. 69 § 1, Hearings, op. cit. 4 (1976). 
116 W. BRANDT, ZUM ATOMSPERRVERTRAG (Berlin Verlag, 1969) p. 14 (removal of 
nuclear weapons from Europe not feasible). Senate HearingB on the Military Impli-
cations of the NPT, 90th Cong., 1st sess., p. 25 (February 28, 1969) (efficacy of 
tactical nuclear weapons to defensive military operations). 
117 JCAE 2d 28-29 (Hl76). 
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norms (jus cogens),118 or a protocol containing a statement of 
principles to which the non-nuclear weapons states adhere. 
F. International legal principles - can they define American 
duties' 
In view of the above section, ought the United States to be 
concerned with the treaty structure as it adds to norms of 
internationallawT The Soviet Union, which maintains a larger 
conventional military force than our own,119 has in the past 
sought total nuclear disarmament.12o Many nations have sup-
ported the United Nations resolution prohibiting the use of 
nuclear weapons in warfare.l2l The legal effect of such resolu-
tions in international law is highly questionable ;122 doubts exist 
. as to the basis for giving effect to such resolutions calling for 
118 Vienna Convention Art. 64, pp. 895 requires treaty conformity with peremptory 
norms of international law. Whether these norms are dynamic, or even presently 
ascertainable, is not clear. SZ'l'UCKI, Jus COGENS AND 'l'BE VIENNA CONVEN'l'ION ON 
'l'BE LAw 011' TREA'l'IES-A CBI'l'ICAL ApPRAISAL, p. 160 (New York: Springer· 
Verlag, 1974). 
119 Library of Congress, United States/Soviet Military Balance, a Frame of 
Reference for Congress, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Armed Services Committee 
(Washington, January 1976); deWeerd, H. A. "18 it time the llAtted 8tatu Beap-
prawed it. Nuolear WeapoM Policie." ARKY MAGAZINE (January 1977) repri'ded 
,,, Congressional Record, (January 25, 1977) s 1404, s 1406. cf. G. Arbatov, "8oviet 
Goal w Nuolear Parity," XXIX cUnent Digest of the Soviet Press 2 (No.5, 
March 2, 1977). . 
120 LARSON, DISARKAKEN'l' AND SOVIE'l' POLICY 1964·68 (New Jersey: Prentice 
Hall, 1969) pp. 34·36. The Khrushchev approach to general disarmament hall not 
been proposed regularly since the removal of the premier. This is due in part 
perhaps to the acceptance by many nations of the invasion of sovereignty by inter· 
national inspectors (including the United States, see note 36, supra). Soviet Foreign 
Minister Gromyko referred to general disarmame:nt in a speech to the Supreme 
Soviet on June 27, 1968, informing members of the conclusion of the NPT (not 
reported in West). NPT hearings 131·132 (1968). As an example of the Khrushchev 
position on general disarmament, see the speech of Mr. Mendelevich of the U. S. S. R. 
on the U. N. Resolution banning the use of nuclear weapons, Par. 41, 16 UNGAOR 
800 (1961). 
121 United Nations General Allsembly Resolution banning the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, UNGA Res. 1635 (XVI). Report of First Committee on Draft Res. II 
(A/4942/ Add. 3), UNGAOR 807 (November 240,1961). 
122 CAS'l'ANEDA, LEGAL ElTEc'l'S 011' UNI'l'ED NA'l'IONS RESOLU'l'IONS 70·71 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 8ee, e.g. Uniting for Peace Resolution 
W. pp. 85·86. 
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external (extra-organizational) acts. One might search for 
authorization, using a constitutional analysis/28 or c~rroborate 
the effect on normative international law by basing it on a 
treaty124 or generally expressed consensus.1211 If international 
legal principles are dynamic, the time may come when the 
United States will have to choose between its own view of 
national defense requirements, and the position it has held as 
an architect of the international system of nuclear arms control. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the benefits to be gained from superpower agree-
ment, the United States should not lose sight of the interna-
tional component of our disarmament strategy, and the real 
legal rights and obligations raised by the "open treaty" struc-
ture which implements it. Rather than engaging in unilateral 
withdrawal of deployed weapons for safety reasons, we should 
assist the IAEA in developing physical security standards/26 or 
reach joint agreements as with Spain. And, in so doing, we 
should not view withdrawal as consent to reduction in our over-
all nuclear defense system. Many nations may simply be rely-
ing on statements such as that issued by the United States in 
conjunction with the NPT,127 and on our increased delivery 
123 See references to Chiu, op. cit., and Hartmann, op. cit., in note 41, 8'Upro. 
Given the right to collective self defense accorded in Article 51 of the U. N. Charter, 
the writer doubts that the General Assembly would have such authority as to order 
nuclear disarmament. 
124 Castaneda op. cit. 139. The NPT committed only the task of safeguards to 
the IAEA, which has no power under its statute to order disarmament or any other 
action, even with respect to materia.ls subject to its safeguard procedures. Article 
VI of NPT makes no reference to the U. N., so there is no apparent basis in this 
treaty for such a U. N. resolution. 
1211Id. p. 150 cf. U. N. Res. 1635 (XVI) note 121 8'Upro. The vote was 55·20 with 
26 abstentions. This does not appear to support a theory of general consensus suffi· 
cient to establish a new peremptory norm of international law. Note 118 8'Upro. 
126 Recent efforts have included the development of a system of physical security 
guidelines for implementation by member states. Doc. INFCIRC/225 (February, 
1976). § 3 refers to general requirements of a Physical Protection System, § 5 to 
those of nuclear materials in use or storage, and § 6 to those for materials in transit. 
127 The U. S. declaration provided in pertinent part: "The United States affirms 
its intt'ntion ... to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any 
222 BoSTON CoLLEGE INTERNATIONAL '" CoKPABATlVE LAW JOtlBNAL [VoL I, No. 1 
capabilities. Agreements such as those proposed for the cur-
• 
rent round of Salt Talks128 should be understood and accepted 
by those nations to whom we have made defense commitments. 
Equally, understandings such as those reached by the supplier 
nations should be broadcast, and incorporated into protocols 
to the NPT expressing such principles as are adopted. 
Finally, the trilateral treaty system, about which we have 
written, should retain the flexibility of arbitration provisions 
and perhaps contemplate enforcement powers by the IAEA. 
This would eliminate the need for "understandings" among 
suppliers, except pursuant to IAEA sanctions. The structure 
of controls would be more dynamic, because it would incorpo-
rate principles derived from individual situations into deci-
sional principles for other cases, without· the present cumber-
some approach of amending each treaty, or the uncertainty of 
"open" treaties. . 
RoBEBT L. COLLINGS 
non-nue1ear-weapon state party to the treaty (NPT) • • . that is a victim of an 
act of aggrellion or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons 
are need." U. N. Sec. Council, 1430th meeting, July 17, 1968, reprinted in Willrich, 
0'1. cit. 200. The U. S. also affirmed the right of collective self-defense pending 
Council Action £d. p. 200. The declaration was made in conjunction· with a vote 
of Security Council Resolution 255 (1968), which welcomed such assurances and 
a1I1rmed the right of collective self-defense measures. Id. p. 198. Bee also, NPT 
Hearings 354·355 (1969). 
128 Note 4, BUprtJ. Although the Soviet Union has apparently rejected reduction 
of strategic delivery vehicles, firm accords limiting numbers to 2400 may be reached, 
and the Soviets appear willing to diBcUII new weapons systems. 
